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RELIGION AND PUBLIC REASON IN THE POLITICS
OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
J. BENJAMIN HURLBUT*
ABSTRACT
Questions about the relevance of religious views to public policy have been
central in debates over the governance of biotechnology since the 1960s.
This article offers an empirical analysis of moments of deliberative politics
surrounding human embryo research, primarily within public bioethics
bodies. I examine how these bodies have used the idea of public reason as
developed in deliberative democratic theory to differentiate between secular
and religious reasons. I argue that scientific authority is made to play a
powerful, but largely unacknowledged role in constructing these categories
by contributing to definitions of the range of “reasonable” pluralism. I
show that notions of right (scientific) knowledge are co-produced with ideas
of how public discourse can be disciplined to comport with an ideal of
public reason. I argue that scientific authority powerfully shapes the contours of public deliberation in ways that are highly consequential for
notions of democratic legitimacy, but are systematically unrecognized by
political theorists.

INTRODUCTION
As the biosciences have generated new capacities for knowing and
intervening in life, they have also come to figure progressively more
centrally on the question of the right relationship between the state,
with its responsibility to protect life, and the authority of democratic
society to declare what forms of life are right, desirable, and good. As
biotechnology comes to touch upon the deepest dimensions of human
life, muddying boundaries between life and non-life, human and nonhuman, it has also challenged the moral and political self-understandings that undergird democratic institutions. Questions about the place
of religious views in public deliberation and policymaking have been
central in debates over the governance of biotechnology since the
1960s. For constitutional democracies that treat freedom of religion as
fundamental to individual liberty and human dignity, the relevance of
deeply held moral and religious views for democratic approaches to
protecting the integrity of life in its most fundamental dimensions
poses a profound challenge.
* J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Ph.D. is assistant professor in the School of Life Sciences at
Arizona State University. Trained in Science and Technology Studies, his research examines the changing relationships between science, politics and law in the governance of
biomedical research and innovation in the 20th and 21st centuries. He holds a Ph.D. in
the History of Science from Harvard University.
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In this Article, I explore how this challenge has been approached
by offering an empirical analysis of several moments of deliberative
politics surrounding biotechnology. In particular, I examine discussions of the ethics of human embryo research, primarily within public
bioethics bodies. I focus upon how these bodies have approached the
question of what sorts of moral views can be appropriately brought to
bear in processes of collective reflection and policymaking.
Public bioethics bodies are an important element in the repertoire
that states have developed to address challenges of governance in the
biosciences.1 In the US context, these bodies have been charged with
the task of deliberating about morally and technically complex questions on behalf of the wider public, with the dual aim of guiding wider
public debate and offering advice to policymakers. As apparatuses of
the state that assume responsibilities on behalf of the public, these bodies face a basic problem of representation: how the few can legitimately
claim to stand in for the many. The problem is particularly acute for
public bioethics bodies. Members of these bodies are appointed, not
elected, and they have often been criticized as inadequately representing the plurality of moral perspectives present in the wider polity.
Because these bodies are not constructed on a stakeholder model, they
cannot claim to represent all relevant interests. Nor can they straightforwardly claim the mantel of expert advisors in the sense of having
specialized knowledge not otherwise available to the public as, for
instance, a science advisory panel to the Environmental Protection
Agency would.2 Rather, they are made responsible for performing the
forms of moral sense-making and collective judgment that are the stuff
of democracy itself.
In what follows, I examine how several bodies sought to legitimate
their claim to stand in for the public.3 I demonstrate that they drew
upon two primary resources. First, rather than claiming to represent
the public, they claimed to represent public reason. They claimed the
competency to engage in the forms of reasoning that democracy
demands, but which the politics of the public square could not deliver.
Second, they drew upon scientific authority to designate the forms of
disagreement and the range of reasons that are appropriately public, as
opposed to the nonpublic reasons that belong to the domain of private
1. SHEILA JASANOFF, DESIGNS ON NATURE: SCIENCE AND DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE AND
UNITED STATES (2005).
2. Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185, 186 (Jon
Elster ed., 1998). The ambiguous role of public bioethics is underscored by the fact that
representation in regulatory science is itself a complex matter. Cf. SHEILA JASANOFF, THE
FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS (1998).
3. My analysis is based on an extensive study of the debates over human embryo
research. I conducted an extensive documentary analysis, including analyzing the full
transcripts of all of the meetings of the bioethics bodies, publications produced by the
bodies and by individual members, as well as transcripts of congressional and other public
hearings, other published materials, government documents, public media reports, and
much more. I also conducted several dozen interviews with central figures in these
debates, including a number of individuals who served as members of these bodies or on
their staff.
THE
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(moral and religious) belief. In this analysis, I focus in particular upon
two public bioethics bodies that mobilized ideas from deliberative democratic theory to define the parameters of legitimately democratic
deliberation. One of my aims is to examine how these ideas function
“in the wild” when deployed as regulative concepts to discipline political discourse into public reason. I show that in constructing ideas of
public reason, they relied upon the epistemic authority of science, and
in particular the uncritical presumption in American political culture
that knowledge stands outside of politics. I show that scientific judgments were placed in asymmetrical relation with public concerns, with
the former placing constraints upon the latter. At the same time, this
dynamic was occluded by an idealized construction of democratic deliberation that at once relies upon the authority of science to be reasonable, and denies that science is inside the fold of politics. Put differently,
to produce conditions of apparently “free public reasoning among
equals,”4 scientific authority was empowered to define the limits of public reason, and thus to declare the conditions under which deliberation
is free and participants equal. Behind this was an imaginary, powerful
in American political culture, that there is an asymmetry between science and politics. Science is univocal whereas politics is fragmented;
science’s reasons are universal, whereas democracy is burdened with
the fact of pluralism. Within this imaginary, science enjoys a privileged
position in distinguishing between the reasonable and the unreasonable, particularly between (secular) public reasons and (religious) nonpublic ones. Science is seen as supplying notions of what is common,
and thus what should be held to be common among those abiding by
the norms of public reason.
Importantly, the controversial issue in this case, human embryo
research, was a site of “ontological politics,” where ontological and normative dimensions of a biological entity or phenomenon are simultaneously contested, and ethical concepts are subject to processes of
ontological clarification, and vice versa.5 (Arguably, most “ethical”
problems in the biosciences fit this description.) In moments of ontological politics, distinctions between scientific and ethical questions,
between what are matters of fact and what are issues of values, are
therefore neither self-evident nor given in advance. Rather, when
issues are clarified or disagreement is settled, these distinctions are consequences, rather than causes of these processes.
One of the foundational observations in the sociology of scientific
knowledge is that facts do not settle controversy, but controversy settles
facts. That is, the stabilization of epistemic claims is arrived at through
social processes that are not themselves explained by reference to the
veracity of the epistemic claims they produce. David Bloor’s principle
of symmetry elevated this insight to a rule of method: social analysis of
knowledge-making should treat the production of claims that are held
4. Cohen, supra note 2, at 186.
5. REFRAMING RIGHTS: BIOCONSTITUTIONALISM
Jasanoff ed., 2011).

IN THE

GENETIC AGE 293–94 (Sheila
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to be true (i.e., credible) and those that are to be false (i.e., incredible)
symmetrically.6 With the concept of coproduction, Sheila Jasanoff has
applied this principle beyond narrow arenas of technical practice to
interrogate the mutual constitution of knowledge and norms—of epistemic and normative configurations of rightness—at the nexus of science and politics.7 Here I am building upon this scholarship to analyze
the coproduction of constructions of science and democracy as the
respective institutional custodians of facts and values, and in particular,
the ways science is drawn upon to construct a public/private distinction
by marking particular kinds of reasons as religious.
The demarcations between facts and values, scientific claims and
moral judgments, premises held in common and personal (religious)
beliefs are not given in advance. Notions of the secular and the religious are deployed to construct the boundaries of acceptable public reason. I show that notions of knowledge, and thus of scientific authority,
are coproduced with ideas of public reason. Science is used to mark
certain reasons as falling into the category of “the religious,” and thus
out of the category of acceptable public reasons. I trace three primary
moves whereby bioethics bodies have deployed science to define ethical
problems and delineate the scope of public reasoning: first, by intervening in moments of ontological politics by making ontological declarations that delimit the scope of (reasonable) ethical deliberation;
second, by serving as exemplar of the kind of reasoning appropriate to
public deliberation; and third, by defining the limits of reasonable
moral concern by declaring the (im)plausibility of possible futures.
In the first section of the article, I briefly discuss the dimensions of
deliberative democratic theory that are relevant to my analysis. In the
second section, I explain my rationale for taking bioethics as a locus of
empirical study. In the third section, I contextualize the cases by offering a brief history of the debates surrounding human embryo research,
including a brief discussion of one bioethics body. In the fourth and
fifth sections, I discuss the two cases that are the main focus of my analysis. The final section concludes the article.
I.
The question of what sorts of moral views can be appropriately
brought to bear in processes of collective reflection and policymaking,
and thus what sorts of reasoning are appropriate to public deliberation,
is a longstanding problem in democratic theory. Never a simple problem, it is rendered all the more challenging given that the new biotechnologies touch upon fundamental dimensions of human life where the
ethical stakes are not easily dissociated from profoundly personal, relig6. DAVID BLOOR, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL IMAGERY (1st ed. 1976); see also BRUNO
LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY (1987).
7. Sheila Jasanoff, The Idiom of Co-Production, in STATES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE CO-PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 1 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 2004); see also SHEILA
JASANOFF, SCIENCE AND PUBLIC REASON (2012).
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ious, and moral commitments. Yet on its surface, this challenge is a
familiar one, since the ways in which the private moral lives of citizens
should or should not figure in the collective lives of democratic societies is a well-worn problem in liberal theory. This is the perennial problem of the place of moral and religious views in the public discourse of
secular societies that have made a dual commitment to protecting the
prerogative of citizens to hold such views, and to preventing public
institutions from privileging any one view over others.
This issue has figured centrally in lines of deliberative democratic
theory that trace their genealogies back to the work of John Rawls.
Here, I offer an (extremely incomplete) sketch of some of the basic
concepts and approaches relevant to my analysis that theorists of deliberative democracy have developed. This sketch is not, and is not
intended to be, comprehensive. As a synopsis of ideas, it is incomplete
and bound to be untrue to the careful philosophical work of scholars in
this area. However, my intention is not to engage with this theoretical
work on its own turf, but rather to examine the social life of these ideas
as they are integrated into spaces of practice. I understand these ideas
as already embedded in a particular political culture and associated
imaginaries. They give articulation to an imagination of the right
ordering of things that is already around in culture, but which through
theoretical codification is rendered more powerful in shaping thought
and practice.
Deliberative democratic theorists in the Rawlsian tradition note the
“fact of reasonable pluralism,” that plural, irreconcilable “comprehensive doctrines” are inevitably held by members of a political community.
This poses a challenge for collective political judgment, particularly
where the aspiration is to arrive at political positions that neither
merely aggregate individual preferences nor are simply majoritarian.
Deliberative democrats in the Rawlsian tradition see significant limitations in aggregative democracy. It supplies a weak foundation for political legitimacy. Deliberation offers a superior solution.
“According to a deliberative conception, a decision is collective just
in case it emerges from arrangements of binding collective choice that
establish conditions of free public reasoning among equals who are governed
by the decisions.”8 Thus, the idea of deliberative democracy is “to tie the
exercise of power to conditions of public reasoning[ ] . . . .”9
The idea of public reason is an attempt to locate political legitimacy in deliberation without running afoul of the fact of reasonable
pluralism. To radically over-simplify, Rawls’ idea of public reason
requires that citizens provide justifications that all other citizens will
find reasonable “by appealing to beliefs, grounds, and political values it
is reasonable for others also to acknowledge,” even if they disagree with
those reasons.10 Under ideal conditions, everyone will be convinced by
the best reasons. But in the real world people will disagree, so everyone
8. Cohen, supra note 2, at 186 (emphasis in original).
9. Id.
10. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 27 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
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must use reasons that seem at least reasonable to everyone else, if not
convincing. This is the principle of reciprocity. It requires that
“[w]hen citizens make moral claims in a deliberative democracy, they
appeal to reasons or principles that can be shared by fellow citizens
. . . .”11 Nonpublic reasons are inappropriate to public reasoning
because they do not comport with shared conceptions of
reasonableness:
[S]hared guidelines for inquiry and methods of reasoning make
that reason public, while freedom of speech and thought in a constitutional regime make that reason free. By contrast, nonpublic
reason is the reason appropriate to individuals and associations
within society: it guides how they quite properly deliberate in making their personal and associational decisions.12

Rawls positions public reason as a constitutional essential. A stable
constitutional regime “should specify not only a shared but if possible a
clear basis of public reason, and one that can publicly be seen to be
sufficiently reliable in its own terms.”13 Political values, particularly
those that touch upon constitutional essentials, must conform to the
requirements of public reason which “bar theological and other comprehensive doctrines from deciding the case.”14 Thus, public reason is
a regulative concept. It is a duty of citizenship that participants in a
political community offer public reasons when engaged in political
deliberation. Public reason, in effect, defines the terms of participation. In theory, it is a normative prerequisite for enacting deliberative
democracy in practice. In practice, however, it plays a disciplinary function in delimiting the rules of participation in a political community.
On some level, this is an intended feature of the idea. It is meant to
shape the practices of a political culture in such a way that that political
culture incorporates those practices as norms. Indeed, it is intended to
play a kind of pedagogical role in shaping members of the political
community. In limiting the kinds of reasons that can be given in political deliberation, “public reasoning itself can help to reduce the diversity
of politically relevant preferences because such preferences are shaped
and even formed in the process of public reasoning itself.”15
My primary concern in this article is the relationship between scientific authority and normative constructions of public reason that play
a regulative function in practices of governance. Knowledge occupies a
profound but neglected role in shaping public reason. Later I demonstrate this through empirical analysis. But it is worth observing the constitutive (even constitutional) role that scientific authority plays in
Rawls’ conception of public reason:
Faced with the fact of reasonable pluralism, and granted that, on
matters of constitutional essentials, basic institutions and public
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 55 (1996).
RAWLS, supra note 10, at 92.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 117.
Cohen, supra note 2, at 199 (emphasis omitted).
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policies should be justifiable to all citizens (as the liberal principle
of legitimacy requires), we allow the parties the general beliefs
and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods
and conclusions of science, when not controversial. . . . So we say
the parties have that kind of general knowledge and they use
those ways of reasoning. This excludes comprehensive religious
and philosophical doctrines (the whole truth as it were) from
being specified as public reasons.16

On this account, the “methods and conclusions of science” occupy
a special category of reasons: reasons that citizens cannot evaluate for
themselves, but must accept as reasonable. Seen as an epistemological
abstraction, scientific knowledge is secured not by its reasonableness for
citizens, but in its correspondence to nature. But as the product of a
social process, knowledge is the product of a community of reason
whose reasons are not (on Rawls’ account) answerable to public reason.
Admittedly, “when not controversial” could be interpreted to mean
“when not controversial in the judgment of the political community.”
But in practice (and in my understanding of Rawls’ intended meaning),
the scientific community is seen as the relevant community of reason
for judging what conclusions of science are (un)controversial. The
idea of public reason as an obligation of citizens to provide and
respond to reasons in terms of “beliefs, grounds, and political values
[that] it is reasonable for others also to acknowledge” places science and
citizens in asymmetrical relation in the space of public reason.17 That
which is marked (by scientific authority) as uncontroverted knowledge
is de facto reasonable, whereas those views that are marked as religious
(potentially, as we shall see below, by invoking scientific authority to
reject critical challenges to science’s ontological accounts) are de facto
excluded. Importantly, this privileged position of science is not an
unbidden intrusion of technocracy into political space of the sort that
Jürgen Habermas has worried about.18 Rather, it is delegated by
democracy to science. It is not colonization, but deference.19
Joshua Cohen argues that the idea of public reason offers a model
for designing institutionalized power to comport with a deliberative
ideal. “We can work out the content of the deliberative democratic
ideal and its conception of public reasoning by considering features of
such reasoning in the idealized case and then aiming to build those
features into institutions.”20 The bioethics bodies that I analyze below
attempted to do precisely this. They positioned themselves as addressing the “fact of reasonable pluralism” by bridging that chasm that sepa16. RAWLS, supra note 10, at 89–90.
17. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
18. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCIETY: STUDENT PROTEST, SCIENCE,
AND POLITICS (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1987).
19. J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Remembering the Future: Science, Law, and the Legacy of
Asilomar, in DREAMSCAPES OF MODERNITY: SOCIOTECHICAL IMAGINARIES AND THE
FABRICATION OF POWER 126–50 (Sheila Jasanoff & Sang-Hyun Kim eds., forthcoming Aug.
2015).
20. Cohen, supra note 2, at 193.
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rates the imaginary world of deliberative democracy from what they saw
as the fact of unreasonable publics.
II.
In the next section, I discuss the attempts of public bioethics bodies to navigate the “fact of reasonable pluralism” by constructing the
parameters of public reason. I examine the actual practices of reasoning undertaken in the name of a democratic public, and in institutional
contexts authorized to do so. My aim is not to hold those practices up
against an idealized normative construct in order to evaluate whether
or not they approximate the ideal. Rather, I am interested in how such
ideal constructions function as ingredients in practice, and in particular
how, as aspirational ideals, they come to configure the practices of the
institutions that employ them. However, before moving on to this
empirical material, I offer a brief rationale for selecting bioethics as an
object of study.
As societies have come to confront new challenges of governance
at the nexus of science and democracy, they have generated new practices and institutions of governance to address them. These institutions
are not merely (or even primarily) shaped by the problems they confront, but also by the ways in which these problems are constructed as
problems—of knowledge, of risk, of violating fundamental moral
boundaries, etc. This, in turn, reflects imaginations of the responsibilities of institutions of governance, and of the right relationships between
science, the state and its citizens. The domain of bioethics is one critical area in which such imaginations have been engaged and shaped,
though often without explicit acknowledgement or clear recognition
that this is happening. As I discuss below, the idea of public reason
advanced in deliberative democratic theory is part of the repertoire of
approaches that public bioethics bodies have drawn upon in identifying
ethical problems and envisioning adequate responses to them.
Bioethics tends to see these moments in terms of the ethically problematic technologies that define them. But the last several decades has
seen extraordinary change not just in science and technology, but in
our moral and political engagements with them. These modes of
engagement have developed over time and across multiple technical
domains, though these systemic continuities are obscured by the reactive proliferation of technology specific subfields like “genethics,”
“neuroethics,” “synbioethics,” etc. Furthermore, they are not only intellectual approaches, but also institutionalized regimes of “oversight,”
authorized to engage in reasoning and judgment on behalf of the rest
of us. (Embryonic Stem Cell research oversight committees are one
example of many.)21 Because bioethics is a consequential part of the
21. J. Benjamin Hurlbut & Jason Scott Robert, Good Governance Connects Science and
Society, 31 J. POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. 706, 722–26 (2012); J. Benjamin Hurlbut & Jason Scott
Robert, Stem Cells, Science and Public Reasoning, 31 J. POL’Y ANAL. & MGMT. 706, 707–14
(2012); Sheila Jasanoff, Making the Facts of Life, in REFRAMING RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 59.
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landscape of contemporary governance, we ought to understand how it
has come to be, and how it carries out its business.
However, beyond watching the watchers for the sake of democratic
accountability, there is much to be learned about how societies imagine
responsibilities of governance by examining these institutions. They
are, in effect, sites of democratic experimentation in the governance of
science and technology. As such, their practices illuminate not only
how we contend with developments in science and technology, but how
democracy itself is re-imagined in the process.22 I focus here on public
bioethics bodies because they are sites where the abstractions of moral
and political theory touch down in arenas of public controversy. Here,
the idealized constructs of democratic theory are put to the test, but
they are also deployed to set the terms of the test—to discipline the
politics of deliberation to conform with particular notions of order and
reasonableness. Whether and how these notions hold offers insight
into the political culture that accepts or rejects them. These experiments reveal a particular “unthought” in culturally powerful notions of
reason, pluralism and democracy.23 Problems of knowledge and of epistemic authority—of what is known, who knows, and what ontological
accounts hold sway—are bound up with ideas of democracy, with normative notions of the modes of deliberation and the forms of reasoning
that make democratic processes legitimate, yet in ways that go effectively unnoticed by students of political theory.
Finally, these are sites of secularization in which notions of the secular and religious are constructed and deployed to regulate reasoning.
Religious and moral pluralism figures centrally in moments where—
science and technology touch upon fundamental dimensions of human
life. It is present as a “fact” of civil society and a figure in public discourse, but also as a foundational constitutional imaginary in American
political culture. Recently, scholars have begun to attend to “formations of the secular,”24 sites where the figures of religion, politics and
secular reason have been constructed and rendered constitutive features of modernity. As Jose Casanova has observed, “the secular has
become a central modern concept—theological-philosophical, legalpolitical, and cultural-anthropological—to construct, codify, grasp and
experience a realm or reality differentiated from ‘the religious.’ ”25
This line of scholarship rejects the thesis that secularization is an inevitable and teleological feature of modernization, and takes the secular
itself as an object of interrogation. Remarkably, science has been
largely neglected as a space in which formations of the secular take
22. J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Reimagining Responsibility in Synthetic Biology, J. RESPONSIBLE
INNOVATION 1–4 (2015).
23. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN
SCIENCES 322–30 (1994).
24. TALAL ASAD, FORMATIONS OF THE SECULAR: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, MODERNITY
(2003).
25. Jose Casanova, The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms, in RETHINKING SECULARISM
54–74 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., 2011).
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shape.26 It has generally been treated as a kind of autonomous institution, injecting its products of knowledge, technique and worldview into
a separate public sphere of meaning and moral imagination. Yet science is a social institution whose fingerprints are all over the basic normative repertoire of modern political order, for instance, as a source of
legitimacy for the state,27 as an exemplar of democracy,28 as an originator of imaginaries of progress and transcendence,29 and, as I argue
below, as a resource in delineating the boundaries between public (secular) and private (religious) modes of reasoning. Science is one of
modernity’s most powerful sites of authority, and has played a constitutive role in the formation of secular imaginations of moral and political
order.30 As Calhoun et al. observe, “the demarcation between the religious and the secular is made, not simply found.”31 Rethinking secularism requires also attending to the roles scientific authority plays in
making (and remaking) this boundary.
III.
By way of background, it is worth briefly reviewing the history of
human embryo research and uses of human in vitro fertilization. During the 1980s, there was a dramatic increase in assisted reproduction
involving in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) in the United States. Louise
Brown, the first child conceived through IVF was born in the U.K. in
1978. The first American baby conceived through IVF was born in
December, 1981. In 1996, when the Centers for Disease Control began
collecting data, roughly 1 in 200 babies born in the United States were
conceived in vitro. As of 2012, the rate was roughly 1.5% of live births.32
In contrast to most European countries, IVF in the United States
has been left largely unregulated at the national level. In the 1980s, the
26. One possible symptom of this neglect is the fact that “science” does not appear
in the index of Charles Taylor’s groundbreaking text in this area. It does appear well
over a hundred times in the text itself, though only as the self-contained locus of particular intellectual and institutional changes that mark (or cause) the emergence of modernity. But science (and technology) are not merely ingredients in the making of the
secular age, but are integrated into it, and are products of it. Taylor’s important turn
from a history of ideas to a history of imagination-in-practice overlooks the extent to
which modernity’s most powerful social imaginaries are, in fact, sociotechnical imaginaries. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007); on sociotechnical imaginaries, see DREAMSCAPES OF MODERNITY: SOCIOTECHICAL IMAGINARIES AND THE FABRICATION OF POWER, supra
note 19.
27. YARON EZRAHI, THE DESCENT OF ICARUS?: SCIENCE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACY (1990).
28. Michael Polanyi, The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory, 1
MINERVA 54 (1962); Alvin M. Weinberg, The Obligations of Citizenship in the Republic of Science, 16 MINERVA 1 (1978).
29. DREAMSCAPES OF MODERNITY: SOCIOTECHICAL IMAGINARIES AND THE FABRICATION
OF POWER, supra note 19.
30. STEVEN SHAPIN & SIMON SCHAFFER, LEVIATHAN AND THE AIR-PUMP (1989).
31. CRAIG CALHOUN ET AL., RETHINKING SECULARISM 20 (2011).
32. 2012 National Summary: Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART) Report, U.S. CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://nccd.cdc.gov/DRH_ART/Apps/National
SummaryReport.aspx (last visited Aug 14, 2014).
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US federal government invested no public funds in either research or
clinical applications of human in vitro fertilization, and therefore
exerted no regulatory control over research practices. The US Food
and Drug Administration did not regulate IVF. In general, private
insurance did not cover IVF, and therefore it was not subject to the
insurance industry’s quasi-regulatory power over medical practices.
Instead, IVF emerged as a purely private sector practice and a consumer good for those who could afford its high price tag. By the mid1980s, efforts had emerged within the American Fertility Society to subject the IVF industry to certain criteria of accreditation and standards.
However, this self-regulatory effort was slow in developing and relatively
weak once it did emerge. Because it lacked the force of law, adherence
by IVF clinics was voluntary and, therefore, incomplete. Given this
unconstrained environment, a significant market for IVF services, and
the lucrative nature of the business, a large IVF industry emerged rapidly in the early to mid-1980s. When Congress turned its attention to it
in the late 1980s, it confronted an already existing industry, with an
established market, established consumer expectations, and existing
(though voluntary) industry rules and norms. Thus, Congress
approached regulation primarily as a matter of consumer protection.
When legislation was finally passed in 1992, it provided only for collection of data on clinics’ success rates so that consumers could make
informed choices about where to seek services. In an environment of
market competition, clinics sought an advantage by achieving higher
rates of live births than their competitors. As a result, US clinics tended
to produce, transfer and cryopreserve more embryos than was permissible in much of Europe.
One consequence of these practices was that by the early 1990s,
there were a large number of cryopreserved IVF embryos that had been
produced by infertile couples in an effort to get pregnant, but were no
longer needed for that purpose. Proponents of research saw these socalled spare frozen embryos as a vast natural resource that could be put
to good use as research material. For research conducted in the private
sector, nothing prevented the use of spare embryos in this way—or, for
that matter, the creation of embryos specifically for research purposes.
But given the enormous federal budget allocated to biomedical
research in the United States, and the fact that academic researchers
rely almost exclusively upon National Institutes of Health (“NIH”)
funding, the de facto ineligibility of human embryo research for federal
support was seen as a significant impediment.
Public ethical debate about in vitro fertilization stretched back
decades, arguably all the way back to the mid-1920s when J.B.S.
Haldane imagined a future in which reproduction was a technologically
mediated process.33 As IVF became technically realistic, it came to figure in imaginations of human biological self-transformation, and
emerging discussions about the responsibility to control and shape the
33.

J. B. S. HALDANE, DAEDALUS

OR

SCIENCE

AND THE

FUTURE (1924).
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human future.34 The primary participants in these discussions were
scientists (often quite prominent ones) and theologians.35 The conversations were not organized around specific technologies so much as the
notions of human purpose that would guide emerging forms of biological control. Thus, technologies like IVF were seen as worrisome in their
own right, but also as emblematic of a posture toward human life that
would subject it to unprecedented technological control. This is evident in the title of a 1972 Journal of the American Medical Association
editorial about in vitro fertilization entitled “Genetic Engineering in
Man.”36 A decade later, IVF technology had become increasingly distanced from the notion of radical control. It was, of course, widely recognized that it could be utilized for these purposes, but by 1980, the
reigning presumption was that, with the right limits, it should be seen
more as an extension (or medical facilitation) of a natural process than
as a radical break with nature.
From the end of the 1970s forward, American lines of debate fell
into three rough categories. First, there was a reproductive rights
frame. Some argued that the line of constitutional interpretation that
had culminated in Roe v. Wade in 1973 clearly drew a boundary around
reproduction as an intimate, private space in which the state could not
interfere. Thus, if considerations of safety could be set aside—and they
were set aside remarkably quickly—IVF could be treated as a medical
procedure that was between a woman and her doctor, and could be
assimilated into an established medico-legal order without further collective evaluation. Though there certainly were ethical questions to be
asked, they too were in the space of individual liberty and judgment.
This line of argument was an important element in the approach that
was adopted by the Ethics Advisory Board (“EAB”) in 1979, the first
ethics body in the United States (and, for that matter, the world) to
deliberate about IVF. This (extra-juridical) interpretation of the law in
effect privatized the moral questions associated with this process.37
The second framing tended to treat the embryo as a key element in
a process of procreation that could be understood more or less as a
technological reconstitution of a natural biological process. Questions
about how to treat the embryo tended to be framed as a problem of
naturalization: of the extent to which laboratory interventions recapitulated or broke with natural procreation. Concerns about the mechanization and commoditization of procreation focused on IVF’s potential
for departure from the script of natural reproduction to produce new
configurations of biological, legal, economic and cultural relationships
34.
35.

See, e.g., MAN AND HIS FUTURE (Gordon Wolstenholme ed. 1963).
JOHN H. EVANS, PLAYING GOD?: HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF PUBLIC BIOETHICAL DEBATE (2002).
36. Editorial, Genetic Engineering in Man: Ethical Considerations, 220 JAMA 721
(1972).
37. James Benjamin Hurlbut, Experiments in Democracy: the Science, Politics and
Ethics of Human Embryo Research in the United States, 1978–2007 (Feb. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with Harvard University), http://sts
program.org/admin/files/imaginaries/Hurlbut-Experiments_in_Democracy.pdf.
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between procreative partners, parents and children. These discussions
also evaluated the experimental appropriation of biological potencies
for laboratory ends by examining the degree to which experiments represented a break with nature processes. For instance, if a certain percentage of embryos would be lost in natural reproduction, then using
experimental techniques in IVF that did not increase this rate might be
permissible. Put simply, this line of discussion focused on the perturbations to traditional configurations of biological, social and moral relations that these technologies heralded, and looked to nature as a
normative touchstone and precedent. Where practices were more analogous to nature, they seemed to demand less ethical justification; where
less analogous, they demanded more.
A third ethical frame that emerged during this period was over the
“moral status” of the human embryo. This frame specifically acknowledged the potential for separating the embryo from a reproductive process, and thus took it as an abstract object of ontological and moral
assessment in itself. On some level, this line of discussion tracked the
new figure of the in vitro embryo as an object in a dish. Abstracted from
the embodied process of procreation, the in vitro human embryo could
be visualized, discussed and governed as an autonomous entity. Indeed
the generic, discursive figure of “the embryo” emerged in discussions of
moral status. The embryo became a decontextualized object of moral
reflection as the procreative purpose of IVF faded into the background.
Discussions of moral status emerged most forcefully around questions of whether IVF embryos could be taken as objects of pure
research. Rather than examine particular experimental uses, this line
of debate first sought a principled answer about the embryo itself,
which could then be the basis for more or less permissive research policies. In effect, the wide range of imagined uses of the embryo focused
conversation on a narrow moral-ontological assessment of what it is in
itself. The prospect of using the embryo as an experimental object
informed how it was approached as a moral subject.
The “moral status” of the human embryo had figured centrally in
ethical deliberations since the late 1970s. In 1978, the first public
bioethics body to assess IVF, the Ethics Advisory Board, had faced the
question of whether the human embryo ought to be treated as a human
subject, and thus afforded the protections that were in the same year
being articulated by National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Behavioral and Biomedical research in what came to be
known as the Belmont Report. For the Ethics Advisory Board (“EAB”),
the issue of moral status came to be informed by an ontological assessment of the human embryo. The Board asked whether the moral judgment that the embryo should be treated as a human person made sense
in light of its biological attributes. This approach took shape largely
under the influence of the natural law inflected sensibilities of the Jesuit theologian and moral philosopher Richard McCormick.
Interestingly, in this respect the EAB’s approach represented a
departure from the National Commission’s 1975 evaluation of fetal
research. The National Commission opted not to address the question
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of when morally significant human life begins. Instead, it treated the
human fetus as a human subject like any other, regardless of its developmental stage. However, when the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (“DHEW”) promulgated regulations governing fetal
research, the fetus was defined as including the human embryo from
implantation forward (roughly fourteen days post-fertilization). By
DHEW’s own account, this was a purely pragmatic distinction: because
the technology of the day could not detect the presence of the conceptus in vivo prior to implantation, a definition that embraced the preimplantation embryo would be unenforceable.38 The EAB assessment of
research on the human embryo addressed precisely this ungoverned
interval of fourteen days. In its recommendations, it drew a bright line
at fourteen days not because there was consensus that it represented a
morally significant moment of ontological transformation, but because
less or more would have required a principled reevaluation of the
existing regulations. In this sense, the boundary was initially somewhat
arbitrary.
From the beginning of these discussions, questions of moral status
were seen as turning in important ways on the embryo’s biological status. Thus, arguments about how the embryo should be treated transmuted into questions of how it should be known and described, and of
what knowledge of biological features of the embryo could clarify, or
even resolve, moral questions. Proponents of the view that the embryo
did not rise to the moral status of a more developmentally advanced
human being tended to point to two biological factors. First, prior to
gastrulation (roughly fourteen days after fertilization), an embryo can
cleave, splitting into two embryos. (This is the process that gives rise to
monozygotic twins.) Second, humans have a high rate of embryo loss.
A significant number of fertilizations do not progress past the relatively
early stages of development. Thus the odds of any given embryo progressing beyond early development are less than half. Some took these
biological accounts to show that the early embryo did not rise to the
level of a full, human moral subject.39 These have become well-worn
arguments in the last thirty-five years. They are widely invoked and
often challenged.40
For my present purposes, I am less interested in the merits of those
arguments themselves than in how they were used to define the limits
of publicly reasonable moral concern. In 1985, the ethics committee of
the American Fertility Society pointed to these biological features of the
38. For the definition of “fetus” and “pregnancy” in the regulations promulgated in
light of the National Commission recommendations, see Fetuses, Pregnant Women, in
Vitro Fertilization, 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526, 33,529 (August 8, 1975). For discussion of comments on the definitions, see Protection of Human Subjects, 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648, 30,651
(Aug. 23, 1974); Protection of Human Subjects, 42 Fed. Reg. 2,792 (Jan. 13, 1977).
39. Though they had different implications in other lines of reason. For instance,
the Ethics Advisory Board took the high rate of embryo loss in vivo as analogous to
embryos that were not transferred to the womb and died in the dish. See Hurlbut, supra
note 37.
40. ROBERT P. GEORGE & CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO: A DEFENSE OF HUMAN
LIFE (2008).
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embryo to argue that the philosophical concept of personhood could
not reasonably attach to the early human conceptus because it simply
did not meet the basic ontological criterion of being an individual. The
committee argued that because the early embryo can twin, it is scientifically incorrect to consider it an individual. And because persons are
necessarily individuals, it is therefore philosophically incoherent to consider it a person, at least where moral judgments give due deference to
scientific knowledge. As the author of this section of the committee
report had put it elsewhere, such a purely scientific account would not
satisfy “individuals committed to a religious view of the matter,” but the
purpose of public deliberation and policymaking was not to address private religious concerns.41
The committee went so far as to coin a new term to distinguish
between the pre- and post-fourteen day embryo: the preembryo. The
committee made clear that this new nomenclature was strictly scientific.
It was “not intended to imply a moral evaluation of the embryo.”42 The
purpose of the term, according to the committee, was to introduce
descriptive accuracy into public debate, thereby disciplining public discourse to take into account relevant facts. The committee believed the
public was concerned about IVF because it was confusing the preembryo with later developmental stages. Thus, the committee hoped the
new term would establish a clear line between an entity of limited moral
concern—the preembryo—and an entity of greater moral status—the
embryo—and thus eliminate ethical objections to embryo research.
The committee hoped that by using these terms, the public would
incorporate an important scientific distinction into moral debate without actually needing to know what facts lay behind the language. The
term would be both “scientifically accurate and meaningful to the public.”43 By using a scientifically authorized distinction, the public could
delegate responsibility for knowing the facts to experts. It would also
make clear the difference between “religious views of the matter” by
revealing them to be at ontological odds with biological reality. The
“preembryo” would make certain biological facts public, while exposing
certain moral arguments as religious and therefore necessarily
nonpublic.
41. Clifford Grobstein, The Moral Uses of ‘Spare’ Embryos, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5,
6 (1982).
42. ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN FERTILITY SOCIETY, Ethical Considerations of
the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY AND STERILITY i, vii (1986).
43. “I think it was looking for some consistently that would be scientifically accurate
and meaningful to the public. And we were concerned about embryos precisely because
of the difference between this developing entity before and after 12 or 14 days. And we
thought use of the term ‘embryo’ was technically misleading. We’re talking about these
cells at an earlier stage than that. And we thought ‘well, preembryo covers them all’ and
that might be the term of art that would be least misleading and still meaningful to the
public. Some said we can be more precise than that, but others said if we’re more precise
the public won’t know what we’re talking about. Embryo was in common use at the time
so preembryo should have been pretty clear.” Interview with Charles McCarthy, Ethics
Committee, American Fertility Society (June 17, 2009).
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What is of interest for my purposes is not the question of whether
the concept of the preembryo was a factual representation of nature or
a value-laden construction masquerading as a fact, though critics of the
term pilloried it as the latter. Rather, I wish to draw attention to the
tacit democratic theory that was behind it: facts always provide a crucial
common ground and, therefore, should precede and constrain valuesquestions. The concept of the preembryo encoded a vision of democratic deliberation in which scientific experts step in to ensure that the
terms of ethical deliberation comport with the relevant facts. Science
provides the correct classifications and democracy sorts out their moral
significance, if any. This technocratic notion of the place of science in
politics is a familiar one. (As I suggested above, it is arguably a tacit, if
not explicit ingredient in Rawls’ idea of public reason). It reflects the
idiom of the science-politics distinction in American political life. Is a
scientific claim pure or politicized? Though this question is meant to
challenge the credibility of a particular claim, it simultaneously affirms
that pure scientific knowledge legitimately precedes and informs values
questions. On this view, democratic questions of “what shall we do”
should defer to scientific declarations of what is the case.
The deliberations of the AFS ethics committee nicely capture what
one might call the constitutional position of science—that is, the privileged position of science in configuring normative arrangements
through the authority to define the nature of the world to which norms
apply, and to demand reformation of norms where they fail to comport
with that world.44 However, although the committee’s approach was
informed by a notion of how scientific knowledge ought to inform public deliberation, it did not ground this notion in an explicit account of
public reason. Thus, while the preembryo was intended to exclude certain particular (ostensibly) religious reasons, it did not attempt to
define the norms whereby one would identify and exclude nonpublic
reasons. However, the bodies discussed in the next two sections did
precisely this, and they relied upon the constitutional position of science to do it.
IV.
In this section I discuss is the Human Embryo Research Panel
(“HERP”). The HERP was constituted in 1993 by the director of the
National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) to explore ethical dimensions of
the use of human embryos in NIH-funded research. NIH had never
funded such research. Since 1975, it had been subject to a regulation
that required that any protocol involving human embryo research be
subjected to review by the Ethics Advisory Board (“EAB”). Though the
Board was created in 1977, it was dissolved at the end of the Carter
administration, and was not reconstituted. As a result, there was a de
facto moratorium on human embryo research in place from 1980 to
1993. In June 1993, Congress passed legislation that nullified that long44.
19.

For a related discussion of science, law, and governance, see Hurlbut, supra note
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standing regulatory requirement.45 The elimination of the requirement for EAB review was interpreted by the National Institutes of
Health as opening the door to all forms of research on human embryos
in vitro. Though there was no longer a regulatory requirement for ethical review, the NIH director Harold Varmus decided that research on
the human embryo was sufficiently sensitive that an advisory body
should be constituted to address ethical questions before any research
proposals were approved. The HERP was assembled to study the issues
and provide a report to the Advisory Committee to the Director. On
February 2, 1994, the Panel held its first meeting.
Like other bioethics bodies that preceded it, the Panel was composed of a variety of different types of experts. It was composed of
nineteen members, representing a range of disciplines including
embryology, reproductive medicine, law, bioethics, sociology, and
patient advocacy. Several of the members were intimately familiar with
the ethical complexities associated with human embryo research. For
instance, Mark Hughes was a pioneering researcher on human preimplantation genetic diagnosis and held a position at NIH. The Panel’s
charge was to ethically evaluate research on the extracorporeal human
embryo. It was to categorize research activities into three classes, those
that were acceptable for federal funding, those warranting further
review, and those that were unacceptable for federal funding. The
Panel held five meetings between February and June of 1994. The
Report of the Human Embryo Research Panel was reviewed and
endorsed by the Advisory Committee to the Director on December 2,
1994, and publicly released the same day.
The panel’s deliberations came at a crucial, transitional moment in
the history of cell biology. More than a decade of research had taken
place since the derivation of embryonic stem cells from mouse embryos
in 1981.46 With new techniques in cell culture and genetics, there was
significant interest amongst developmental biologists in studying
human embryogenesis and cellular differentiation, with corollary hope
that these techniques might lead to new understandings of—and therapeutic interventions in—human disease. Researchers saw human
embryos as a powerful resource for these purposes. In this imagination,
the in vitro human embryo was no longer circumscribed to the project
of procreation. While clinical IVF formed important background infrastructure for this vision, it was as a source of embryos, and no longer the
sole context in which in vitro embryos might be put to research use.
The large surplus of embryos (and, potentially, gametes) that had been
generated within the private space of assisted reproduction could be
allowed to spill over into the domain of public science. Thus, the
HERP approached the embryo as a potential research object, not as an
45. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43,
§ 121(c), 107 Stat. 133 (1993) (repealing 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(d)).
46. Gail R. Martin, Isolation of a Pluripotent Cell Line from Early Mouse Embryos Cultured
in Medium Conditioned by Teratocarcinoma Stem Cells, 78 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 7634
(1981); M. J. Evans & M. H. Kaufman, Establishment in Culture of Pluripotential Cells from
Mouse Embryos, 292 NATURE 154 (1981).
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element in a process of procreation. Though many of the imagined
applications of embryo research were related to reproduction (and contraception), the HERP focused on the potential value of the human
embryo for research on cancer, toxicology, and as a potential source of
human embryonic stem cells. Indeed, some Panel members saw the
HERP as a critical vehicle for opening up a fundamental, potentially
revolutionary domain of human biological research, and lending it the
legitimacy of American academic science. As one member put it, the
Panel would help to shift authority over embryo research into the jurisdiction of the scientific community—to “return this research to peerreview.”47
Despite its broad charge, the HERP made an evaluation of the
moral status of the human embryo the centerpiece of its deliberations.
Its members assumed that if they could locate the embryo in the appropriate category of moral worth, the (im)permissibility of its uses would
follow. The Panel zeroed in on questions of moral and ontological status almost immediately. In the first hour of the first meeting, during a
very preliminary discussion of the Panel’s charge, Chairman Steven
Muller asked for a “working definition of an embryo.” Duane Alexander, the director of the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development, who was present at the meeting to welcome the members, directed Muller to the Panel’s briefing materials. The glossary
defined the embryo as “the developing human from about two weeks
after fertilization until the end of the eighth week.” That definition
was, according to Alexander, “pretty much a standard one.” Other
Panel members disagreed, maintaining that the term refers to the conceptus from fertilization forward. Within moments, the Panel was
already engaged in a discussion of the significance of gastrulation, twinning, and the formation of a body axis for the definition of the embryo,
as well as the biological, social and legal significance of these developmental markers.48
The Panel generally accepted the AFS Committee’s conclusions
about the preembryo: gastrulation was both a biological and morally
significant marker; the primitive streak was a line drawn by nature that
should also be drawn in law. But for HERP, unlike for the AFS committee, this was couched as a normative judgment, not a scientific one.
Whereas the AFS committee had made a direct leap from biological
status to moral status, for the Panel, this step was grounded in an
account of public reason. The Panel concluded that gastrulation was a
morally significant marker not simply because of the differences in the
nature of the embryo before and after, but because a sufficiently large
plurality of reasonable moral arguments could be made in favor of protecting the embryo at this stage. Whereas the AFS committee had
treated the transition from preembryo to embryo as a decisive change
in kind that was given in nature, the Panel approached embryogenesis
47. NIH HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, MEETING TRANSCRIPT 34 (Feb. 2, 1994)
(on file with author).
48. Id. at 30–32.
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as a continuum, and the scientific demarcation of stages more as function of judgment than of observation. In this respect, it saw biological
description as analogous to moral judgment; both were intended to
lend order to complex phenomena.49 The question, then, was whether
a given judgment ordered things in a reasonable way. Because the
judgment about moral status was a public policy matter, HERP argued,
no single argument could be decisive so long as there was public disagreement. Moreover, moral intuitions differ about the biological precondition for personhood. Therefore, instead of a single criterion like
genetic uniqueness or individuation, the panel took into account “a
variety of distinct, intersecting, and mutually supporting considerations.”50 The key concept here was the notion of the “reasonable.”
Here, the Panel leaned on an idea of public reason developed by the
American political theorist and moral philosopher John Rawls. Citing
Rawls, the report stated that: “Public policy employs reasoning that is
understandable in terms that are independent of a particular religious,
theological, or philosophical perspective, and it requires a weighing of
arguments in the light of the best available information and scientific
knowledge.”51Citing Rawls, the report stated that:
Public policy employs reasoning that is understandable in terms
that are independent of a particular religious, theological, or philosophical perspective, and it requires a weighing of arguments in
the light of the best available information and scientific
knowledge.52

Guided by Rawls’ notion of public reason, HERP set about to determine what (and whose) arguments met this test. The Panel took on an
arbitrational role, judging moral arguments not on their merits, but on
their reasonableness. If the Panel thought reasonable people would
find an argument convincing, it was given greater weight. This was
based on the Panel’s imagination of the reasonable person, not on public consultation. In fact, the Panel specifically did not invite input from
the public. Instead, the Panel made a judgment about what kinds of
reasons people ought to agree upon. And here they agreed with the
AFS committee: scientific reasons are common to everyone, at least to
everyone who is reasonable.
The Panel treated accounts that invoked scientific evidence as
closer to public reasons—closer to the sorts of reasons that reasonable
minds by definition will agree upon. HERP thus narrowed the sorts of
moral arguments that had to be taken into account in public delibera49. Green reiterated and strengthened this claim repeatedly after he served on the
HERP. See RONALD M. GREEN, THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH DEBATES: BIOETHICS IN THE
VORTEX OF CONTROVERSY (2001); Ronald M. Green, Stem Cell Research: A Target Article Collection, Part III—Determining Moral Status, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 20 (2002); Ronald M.
Green, The Ethical Considerations, 286 SCI. AM. 48 (2002).
50. AD HOC GRP. OF CONSULTANTS TO THE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE DIR., NAT’L INST.
OF HEALTH REPORT OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL 38 (1994).
51. Id. at 39–40.
52. Id. at 39–40.
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tion. The Panel drew the circle of reasonable pluralism, and placed
science at the center.
The moral views that made it into the circle were those that most
directly corresponded with scientific evidence. In weighing arguments,
the Panel privileged those that it thought could be challenged only
through recourse to background moral and religious beliefs, or, in
Rawls’ terms, “comprehensive doctrines.” Conversely, it excluded arguments that it deemed to depend on comprehensive doctrines, particularly religious ones. For instance, the Panel claimed that the
theological belief that the embryo is ensouled at fertilization is unreasonable because the individual is definitively present only at gastrulation—before that the embryo can split into two.53 Conversely, the
belief that the embryo is not a person until after the formation of the
primitive streak is reasonable, because it is justified by reference to universal and incontestable scientific reasons, not controverted theological
ones.54 The Panel treated accounts that invoked scientific evidence as
closer to public reasons—closer to the sorts of reasons that reasonable
minds would find intelligible and compelling. Thus, whereas the AFS
committee privileged scientific authority on technocratic grounds, the
Panel offered a democratic theory that positioned science as an exemplar of reasonableness, and a measure against which to judge other
kinds of reasons.
In this way, the Panel positioned itself as a judge of reasons and
arbiter of the community of judgment. It positioned itself as standing
in for the public by performing public reason, by balancing those reasons it deemed reasonable until preponderance tipped the scale. By
considering only those reasons it deemed to be publicly reasonable, it
likewise assumed the role of safeguarding the rational integrity and
political legitimacy of judgment.
This idea of public reason also shaped how the Panel engaged the
public. It tended to exclude non-expert voices. From early in its deliberations the panel was convinced that the majority of Americans did not
understand the issues well enough to hold reasonable positions, so
there was no need to solicit public input. It used public ignorance and
the idea of public reason to justify its representational role. When critics objected that the Panel membership was personally biased toward
permitting embryo research, Panel members agreed, but denied that
this undermined the Panel’s legitimacy. They argued that the Panel
nevertheless represented the public because its job was to reason on
behalf of the public, not to embody public disagreement in its various
factions. The Panel could stand in for the public by doing the sort of
reasoning that the politics in the public square had failed to do. In this
sense, the Panel saw itself as closer to an ideally reasonable deliberative
community than could ever be achieved in the public square. By stepping in as an arbiter of public reasons, the Panel constructed an author53. Id. at 47.
54. Id.
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itative space for ethical experts—experts who did not necessarily know
better than the citizen, but who could reason on the citizen’s behalf.
HERP recommended that research on left-over IVF embryos be
permitted prior to gastrulation, and that embryos be created specifically
for research purposes under certain circumstances. In December of
1994, NIH director Harold Varmus endorsed these recommendations.
Shortly thereafter, Congress passed legislation banning federal funding
for any research in which a human embryo is harmed or destroyed. An
appropriations bill rider known as the Dickey-Wicker Amendment
placed embryos in the regulatory category of human subjects, sidestepping the ontological question by employing an existing ethical and
legally defined category. But things quickly become ontologically
murky once again following two key scientific developments: Dolly the
cloned sheep in 1997, and the derivation of human embryonic stem
cells in 1998.
V.
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission (“NBAC”) was created by the executive order of President Clinton in 1995. After scientists announced that they had successfully cloned a sheep using an adult
somatic cell, Clinton called upon NBAC to assess the ethics of human
cloning.55 He also called upon the Commission to examine issues associated with human embryonic stem cell research after embryonic stem
cells were cultured by researchers at the University of Wisconsin in late
1998.56
NBAC’s approach reflected the procedural and principlist elements of professional bioethics, but as a public body it also acknowledged the plurality of moral approaches represented in the American
polity. To accommodate the fact of pluralism, the Commission undertook to translate pluralistic particularities into democratic universals.
As Commissioner Charo explained to the House Subcommittee on
Health and Environment, NBAC would solicit the “widest possible
range of views so that no aspect of public sentiment is left unexplored.”57 By mobilizing the full range of American pluralism, the
commission promised to represent every citizen while also locating
premises held in common beneath pluralistic disagreement. According
to Commissioner Tom Murray, public deliberation would benefit from
encountering the “strongest representations” of differing positions on
cloning.58 In practice, this meant soliciting religious views. Represent55. K. H. S. Campbell et al., Sheep Cloned by Nuclear Transfer from a Cultured Cell Line,
380 NATURE 64 (1996).
56. James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human Blastocysts,
282 SCIENCE 1145 (1998).
57. Cloning: Legal, Medical, Ethical, and Social Issues: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. on
Health and the Environment, 105th Cong. 36 (1998) (statement of R. Alta Charo, Comm’r,
Nat’l Bioethics Advisory Comm.).
58. Biotechnology and the Ethics of Cloning: How Far Should We Go?: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Tech. of the H. Comm. on Sci., 105th Cong. 26 (1997) (statement of Tom Murray, Chairman, Genetics Testing Subcomm. of the Nat’l Bioethics Advisory Comm.).
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atives of a range of religions were brought in to testify and were told to
speak in explicitly theological terms.
NBAC differed from HERP not only in what sort of input it sought,
but how it understood that input. While HERP had privileged reasons
that were grounded in science, NBAC treated all disagreement over
embryo research as moral disagreement. NBAC’s equalizing move created an important asymmetry. Whereas HERP had subjected all claims
to the same test of reasonableness, NBAC treated scientific and moral
questions as epistemologically separate, and therefore as belonging to a
distinct sphere of authority.
The Commission thus ignored competing ontological representations. This was significant, because recent scientific developments had
generated significant controversy over the biological status of its ambiguous, new artifacts. For example, just after scientists reported that they
had succeeded in culturing human embryonic stem cells, the New York
Times reported a bizarre experiment conducted by Advanced Cell Technologies (“ACT”), a small biotechnology company. An ACT-supported
researcher had transferred human somatic cell nuclei into bovine
oocytes, producing several cleavage stage “embryos” from which cells
were derived and cultured.
The company’s stated intention in making the experiments public
was to test the “public acceptability” of the research. Finding that the
results were insufficient to warrant publication in a scientific journal,
the company decided that it “was in the public interest to release the
preliminary results to promote an informed and reasoned public discussion of the issues.”59
The announcement elicited anxiety from numerous quarters.
Many observed that this ontologically ambiguous, boundary-crossing
entity had complicated processes of ethical sense-making as well. Glenn
McGee, a professor of bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania,
declared that ACT had created an ontological ambiguity that would not
make things any easier for ethicists. “What this whole business shows is
that we are in a regulatory nightmare[.] . . . It’s going to be impossible
to state whether these things are really human, let alone how to protect
them.”60 Nicholas Wade of the New York Times noted, “[a] perplexing
feature of the hybrid embryo would be that it would start mostly bovine,
then become mostly yet not entirely human.”61 A “deeply troubled”
President Clinton requested that the National Bioethics Advisory Com-

59. Biotech Company Says Nuclear Transfer Research Blocked by Policy Confusion, REUTERS
HEALTH MED. NEWS, Nov. 13, 1998, § Media.
60. Rick Weiss, A Cloning Claim’s Controversies, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1998, at A03,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/science/cloning/keystor
ies/111398.htm.
61. Nicholas Wade, Researchers Claim Embryonic Cell Mix Of Human and Cow, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 12, 1998, § A.
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mission consider the implications of ACT’s research and report back
within the week.62
The ACT experiment challenged the categories that underwrote
NBAC’s strong distinction between ontological and ethical evaluation.
Using the law’s familiar mode of analogical reasoning, Commissioner
and lawyer R. Alta Charo suggested that “part of the analysis that one
would want to develop for the President could focus on what this fused
cell is most like that we already know. Is it most like two non-gametic
cells that are fused, or is it most like a regular human embryo, or is it
most like something else?” Stanford geneticist David Cox supplied an
authoritative answer: “It’s new, Alta, is what it is.” Yet in its response to
President Clinton, the Commission expressed uncertainty about the
ACT experiment while at once affirming that a clear (scientifically
authoritative) classification was an obligatory passage point into ethical
analysis. According to NBAC, it was unclear whether the “construct”
was an embryo, by which they meant “an organism . . . which has the
potential, if transferred to a uterus, to develop in the normal course of
events into a living human being.”63 If it was, it raised “complex and
controversial” concerns.64 If not, the research raised no new ethical
issues.65
By punting on the question of who is responsible for saying what a
biological entity is, the Commission sidestepped the very problem of
ontological politics that had given rise to the problem of “moral status”
in the first place. On NBAC’s view, ethical analysis could proceed without resolving the status of the entity because legitimate democratic disagreement was, by definition, disagreement over questions of values.
Ontological and normative questions were, therefore, subject to two
very different institutions: science and democracy respectively. The
process of answering fact questions belonged to a different deliberative
community employing different criteria of evaluation. Each could proceed independently of the other, with their respective results ultimately
linked together in forming policy.
By erecting a strong boundary between science and democracy, the
Commission was able to attribute all public disagreement to the fact of
reasonable pluralism. Rather than simply exclude (putatively) theologically informed ontological accounts from the mix as the Human
Embryo Research Panel had, NBAC took the opposite tack. It treated
accounts of what the embryo is as primarily moral (and theological)
and secondarily epistemic. Put differently, the Commission judged that
if ontological questions were important in ethical debates, it was only
because some system of values had attached particular meanings to
them. These meanings could be dissociated from the ontological ques62. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL
RESEARCH app. at 88 (1999) (Letter from President William J. Clinton to Dr. Harold T.
Shapiro, Chair, National Bioethics Advisory Commission).
63. Id. at app. 90–91 (Letter from Dr. T. Harold Shapiro to President William J.
Clinton).
64. Id.
65. Id.
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tions, and treated as yet one more moral account in the range of plural
perspectives. Controversy over the embryo was a straightforward result
of moral heterogeneity within the polity.
By characterizing these ontological debates as covertly moral,
NBAC bounded moral deliberation from ontological sense-making and
separated problems of knowing accurately and reasoning well. As one
commissioner put it, “let’s stop staring at the embryo and looking for
the source of its meaning,” and instead look “at its context in our lives,
including how and why it was brought into creation.”66 Representing
the embryo meant uncovering the pluralistic moral representations of
the embryo, and exposing whatever common principles lay beneath
them. The disagreements that the AFS committee expected to resolve
through technocratic clarification of ontological confusion, NBAC
treated as moral disagreement by other means. Moral status ceased to
be a problem of how to relate to the embryo, and instead became a
problem of how to relate one person’s moral convictions to the next’s.
Thus, the Commission abandoned the search for consensus in an
ontological account of what an embryo is, and instead gathered the
“input of a group of religious scholars from diverse faith traditions
whose views within and across traditions reflected the diversity found
within the public as a whole.”67 Indeed, the commission instructed witnesses who were meant to represent religious perspectives to speak in
explicitly theological terms. Bioethicist Gilbert Meilander was asked to
represent a Protestant perspective, even though his scholarship was disciplinarily closer to bioethics than to Protestant theology. He noted
that, although he had been directed to speak in explicitly theological
terms, he could have made very similar arguments without drawing on
Protestant theology in any way. Lisa Cahill was asked to present a Catholic perspective. She too assumed a theological idiom, but noted that
NBAC’s boundary construction enforced an artificial distinction
between theological and secular (including scientific) reasoning. She
noted that many of the Catholic arguments were grounded more in
natural law theory than in Catholic dogma.
This strategy appears to be at odds with the ideas of public reasoning and democratic legitimacy that the Commission endorsed. It wrote,
“an appropriate approach to public policy in this area is to develop policies that demonstrate respect for all reasonable alternative points of
view and that focus, when possible, on the shared fundamental values
that these divergent opinions, in their own ways, seek to affirm.”68 In
seeking religious perspectives, it was soliciting reasons that diverged
rather than converged on “shared fundamental values.” NBAC resolved
this contradiction through three related ideas of representation. First,
it treated religious accounts as the furthest removed from overlapping
consensus in public views. By capturing the diversity of religious views,
66. Steve Holtzman, Remarks at the 31st Meeting of the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission 228 (May 11, 1999).
67. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 61, at 4.
68. Id. at 51.
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the full range of moral views held by “the public as a whole” were adequately represented. These views constituted a kind of snapshot of raw
(pre-reasonable) pluralism. Views expressed in terms of “comprehensive doctrines” captured the forms of divergent disagreement that had
not taken any steps toward translation into public reasons. Second, as
noted above, it segregated representations of facts from representations
of values by treating ontological disagreements as value-interpretations.
Third, it positioned itself as serving a particular kind of representational role by performing public reasoning on the public’s behalf. Its
aim was to discover an incipient overlapping consensus in the picture of
divergent disagreement that it had assembled. It assumed that overlapping consensus was possible, but the public had failed to achieve it on
its own because it was not adequately committed to (or capable of) finding the “shared fundamental values that these divergent opinions, in
their own ways, seek to affirm.” This third representational move
depended upon the other two. By soliciting reasons that demonstrably
failed the test of being “acknowledged by all as reasons,”69 on the one
hand, and designating ontological questions as being beyond—and
irrelevant to—its remit, it marked out the boundaries of appropriately
public reasons. The problem of society’s relationship to the embryo,
and the corollary question of its moral status, gave way to an ontology of
public reason. In effect, the moral problem of moral status became dissociated from the embryo as an entity in the world.
In soliciting theological perspectives, NBAC made two key assumptions. First, it treated the distinction between fact and value as epistemologically unproblematic. This is remarkable not only in light of the
ontologically ambiguous entities discussed above, but also because most
of the witnesses grounded their ethical accounts of how the embryo
should be treated in accounts of what the embryo is and in notions of
what biological features they considered relevant to moral judgments.
In short, ethical evaluations tended to be grounded in (somewhat divergent) ontological accounts. By drawing a strong boundary between fact
and value, the Commission absolved itself of having to deal with the
problem of the right relationship between scientific authority and democratic authority. Public moral sense-making then became a procedural matter of reconciling the range of views that liberal democracy
permitted.
Second, it assumed that, where there is agreement on matters of
fact among experts, public disagreements must necessarily be over values, even if couched as disagreements over matters of fact. Therefore,
to bring all moral views out into the open, it would be necessary to
translate disagreements on matters of fact into a values idiom. As a
result, the authority of competing claims would be grounded in nothing beyond the right of individuals to hold their own moral and religious views.
With these assumptions NBAC set out to analyze and mediate
moral disagreement. It assumed the role of translating religious (non69.

Cohen, supra note 2, at 186.
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public) reasons into secular, ethical (public) reasons in order to bring
them in line with the rules of public reason. The Commission’s Stem
Cell Report quoted political theorists Dennis Thompson and Amy Gutmann: “[T]he construction of public policy on morally controversial
matters should involve a ‘search for significant points of convergence
between one’s own understandings and those of citizens whose positions, taken in their more comprehensive forms, one must reject.’ ”70
For Gutmann and Thomspon, this is a normative requirement of democratic deliberation and policy formation. Given the fact of reasonable
pluralism, a procedural means is required to move from disagreement
to democratically legitimate resolution. The ideal means, they argue, is
robust deliberation in which imbalances in political power and understanding are neutralized. Therefore, everyone must adhere to certain
norms of engagement in the public square. The most important norm
is “reciprocity.” The principle of reciprocity requires that “[w]hen citizens make moral claims in a deliberative democracy, they appeal to reasons or principles that can be shared by fellow citizens . . . .”71 These
reasons should be “recognizably moral in form and mutually acceptable
in content.”72 A claim fails the test of reciprocity when “it imposes a
requirement on other citizens to adopt one’s sectarian way of life as a
condition of gaining access to the moral understanding that is essential
to judging the validity of one’s moral claims.” In keeping with Rawls as
discussed above, Gutmann and Thompson briefly note that another element of reciprocity is the “plausibility” of fact claims.73
The Commission sought as “wide a set of views as possible,” and
discerned the “points of convergence” between these views. It translated reasons that were closed to general moral understanding—explicitly theological reasons, for example—into reasons that “could be
shared by fellow citizens.” The role of the public bioethics body, as
NBAC saw it, was to translate nonpublic (i.e., religious) reasons into a
secular, ideologically neutral, normative idiom that could, as far as possible, unify the moral pluralism of the American public. NBAC, like
HERP before it, drew a Rawlsian distinction between public and nonpublic reasons. The Commission maintained that for public policy to
be legitimate, it had to be grounded in “the shared fundamental values
that . . . [all reasonable alternative points of view] in their own ways,
seek to affirm.”74 “Reasonable” here meant simply that a moral position could be translated into a common, secular currency. For NBAC,
the appropriate limits of pluralistic representation corresponded with
the limits to translation: public policy should incorporate only those
positions that can be translated into generic, common principles.
In discussion, Commissioners tended to distinguish between the
“religious” and the “ethical,” which meant nonpublic and public reasons respectively. Certain Commissioners repeatedly commented on
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 61, at 51 (citation omitted).
GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 11, at 55.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 56.
NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 61, at 51.
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the difficulties of translating the former into the latter. Translation
became a gate-keeping device; if Commissioners could not come up
with what they thought was a reasonable translation of a theological
claim, they excluded it. During the cloning deliberations, Tom Murray
said,
I was one of the people . . . who repeatedly asked the religiouslyoriented thinkers at our last meeting if they could also try to state
their concerns in ways that would be accessible to those who did
not necessarily share all their faith commitments. I am going to
continue to do that because it is one thing to say that we should
respect your belief just because you hold this belief deeply, and I
think we should respect those beliefs, but it is difficult to know
exactly what to do with that when one comes to making public
policy.75

For NBAC, translation from religious to secular reasons was not a
matter of merely scratching out references to God and seeing whether
the resulting sentence was still coherent. It was a means for transforming half-formed moral declarations into rationally coherent arguments
that abided by the rules of public reason, including in particular,
rational consistency. Sometimes this meant uncovering putatively tacit
elements of a moral position—elements that the proponent of that
position would not necessarily recognize as his or her own. For
instance, the stem cell report leaned on an argument from philosopher
Ronald Dworkin about abortion. Dworkin argued that few anti-abortion Americans genuinely believe that the conceptus is a person.76
Those who accept abortion in cases of rape or incest, for instance, hold
moral positions that are inconsistent with a position of fetal personhood.77 Since anyone engaged in public moral deliberation is
bound by a commitment to consistency, the only way to resolve this
apparent inconsistency is to recognize that the anti-abortionist is in reality open to balancing harm to the fetus against other harms or goods.78
NBAC treated this discovery of openness to balancing as a “shared view”
of proponents and opponents of embryo research.79 On this basis,
NBAC concluded that since most defenders of nascent human life were
unwittingly open to balancing protection of the embryo against other
goods, destruction of embryos is permissible to secure compelling therapeutic benefits. The Committee described this conclusion as a “reasonable statement of the kind of agreement that could be possible.”80
Thus under NBAC, the public ethics body became an organ of
democratic deliberation grafted onto the body of existing American
institutions to rectify a new kind of failure in the public square: the
75. Tom Murray, Commissioner, Remarks at the Meeting of the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission 12 (Apr. 13, 1997).
76. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1st ed. 1993).
77. Id. at 95–97.
78. Id. at 97.
79. NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 61, at 51.
80. Id. at 52.
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failure to reason properly about a morally complex technical domain.
By assuming this role as guardian of public reasoning and applying its
rational acuity to problems of pluralistic disagreement, NBAC would
nurture moral arguments beyond the limits of the citizen’s own philosophical faculties and produce ideally democratic deliberation without
relying on the polity itself to do the deliberating. Yet equally noteworthy is the kind of reasoning that NBAC imagined to be ideal. NBAC in
effect made itself a moral calculating machine. It defined the rules of
the game by operationalizing the norms of public reason. Democracy
would be achieved through a kind of philosophical-bureaucratic commensuration of (pre-reasonable) values claims by subjecting them to
tests of internal consistency and translatability into a common, secular
idiom. Its approach was predicated on the notion that facts and values
are self-evidently distinct, and are subject to completely separate
regimes of justification. The consequence was that the ontological—
and moral—ambiguity of the material world was removed from the calculative picture. The subject of moral deliberation ceased to be the
instrumental use of the human embryo, and became the mechanical
extraction of legitimately democratic moral principles from the public’s
(nonpublic) reasoning. Knowing what was right in the light of public
reason was artificially severed from the problem of right knowledge of
things in the world. And the authority to declare what a thing is such
that society’s oughts could be made to apply to it was thereby delegated
to science.
It is worth noting, therefore, that NBAC’s calculative process was
organized by a balancing test whose parameters were defined by science. In weighing public moral concerns against promised scientific
benefits, it deferred to scientific imaginations of plausible technological
futures. It asymmetrically subjected public concerns to critical scrutiny
without similarly questioning scientific imaginations of the future and
the visions of the good with which they are inflected. Indeed, on
NBAC’s dogmatic demarcation between matters of fact and matters of
value, it is not clear how such symmetrical scrutiny could be undertaken. But given the profoundly powerful role that science plays in
public moral sense-making by virtue of its authority to declare what is
and to predict what shall be, this very fact suggests a profound pathology in NBAC’s imagination of reason.
CONCLUSION
It is commonplace to mark science and technology’s extraordinary
powers over life with the epithet of revolution. “Biological revolution”
evokes rupture and transformation, a discontinuity between life as we
know it and our lives to come. Yet revolution is a political concept.
This Article has argued that the biological revolution is wrought as
much in the laboratories of democracy as in the experimental spaces of
technoscience. New biotechnologies have disturbed fundamental but
delicate formations in the landscape of collective life; rendering urgent
the question of by what criteria we will determine inclusion in the
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moral community. As this Article has demonstrated, those criteria are
at once ontological and political: our ethical postures toward the
human at the boundaries of life are refracted through the circle of
politics and in the imaginations of reason that inscribe it.
I have followed the “idea of public reason” as a construct in democratic theory into arenas of political practice where fundamental
dimensions of human life—biological and political—are at stake. I
have argued that the idea of public reason, deployed in these contexts,
was used to discipline public discourse according to criteria that were
not democratically derived. Drawing upon the authority of science as a
source of incontestable reasons, public bioethics bodies narrowed the
forms of disagreement and the range of reasons that they would recognize as appropriately public, relegating to the domains of nonpublic
reasons moral imaginations that would not easily conform to declared
distinctions between fact and value, secular and religious. I have
argued that these bodies positioned themselves as legitimately standing
in for the public by claiming to represent public reason, disciplining
democracy and silencing public voices in the name of the self-same
democratic public.
These bodies represent only a few modest experiments in democracy’s wide laboratory. But they are sites where we can see modernity’s
powerful imaginaries touch down and develop in novel forms and
directions. They are moments where the vernacular of public reason is
refined and altered, and where the basic normative vocabularies that
regulate the democratic imagination take on altered meanings. I have
argued that the boundaries between the secular and the religious, and
between the ontological and the normative—boundaries that the idea
of public reason takes as given in advance—were refined and reconstructed in these moments.
These were moments of secularization, but as such were expressions of agency and imagination, not of some logic of historical progress that inhabits our institutions. Secularization, like its cousin
concept scientific progress, is too readily naturalized to an imaginary of
modernity’s inevitable forward march. Yet when we look closely at the
practices of the institutions that are ostensibly shaped by these overarching logics, we see that these logics are, in fact, enacted in the practices of these very institutions. Understanding how they are enacted,
and in deference to what under-scrutinized imaginations, therefore
becomes an urgent task. One critical element of this task is to attend to
the remarkable absence of science in contemporary theories of politics.
The institution of science is perhaps the defining achievement of
secular modernity. If we refuse to take modernity’s defining categories
as natural and given in advance, we must look also to the forms of
power that reside with this institution. To this end, we must attend to
the constructions of reason that define the social contract between science and democracy, and to the constitutional position of science in
arenas of collective moral sense-making.
Imagining public reason is a problem for—and a privilege of—
democracy. In the cases examined in this essay, the idea of public rea-
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son was wielded as a device of exclusion, weeding out those voices that
spoke in an unsanctioned idiom and disciplining moral imaginations
into a homogenized false pluralism. An exercise of power was undertaken in the name of freedom and equality. Yet the reservoir of authority that was drawn upon to this end is not in the conventional pantheon
of institutional power. Therefore, the exercise of exclusion is not easily
recognized as such. In our collective imagination, the institution of science seems to sit outside the arena of politics. Science is called upon to
assume responsibility for forms of complexity, ambiguity and disagreement that we would rather not have to shoulder as a society, that we
would rather have spoken by the faceless authority of the fact than
through our own, far less powerful, far less univocal, but far more personal voices.
To the persistent fact of reasonable pluralism, science seems to
offer a univocal view from nowhere, and thus a powerful resource for
contending with disagreement by reducing the range of reasons which
democracy must entertain. Yet at its most fundamental level, the purpose of deliberative politics is not merely to ground the exercise of
power in robust procedures of collective judgment, although this is a
venerable aim. Its most profound promise lies in the commitment to
respect and harness the richness of collective moral imagination “lest
one good custom should corrupt the world.”81 The challenge, then, is
to recognize reason itself as inhabiting the practices, institutions and
imaginations whereby we arrive at accounts we deem to be right—true
to the world as we know it, and as we wish it to be.

81. Alfred Tennyson, The Passing of the King, in IDYLLS
ed.,1989)
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